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ARTICLES
OUTSIDE THE "COMPENSATION BARGAIN:"
PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF WORKERS




An employee is injured at work. After recovering from her
injury she is terminated from her employment. May she
sue her employer in court for discrimination because of
her physical disability? Yes. Under [California] Govern-
ment Code section 12993, subdivision (a), she is not
barred from doing so by the workers' compensation laws. 1
So begins the landmark case of City of Moorpark v. Supe-
rior Court (hereinafter "Dillon"), the first case to argue that
discrimination for an industrial injury should not be treated
differently than discrimination for non-industrial injuries in
the workplace.
Until recently, a worker injured on the job could not
bring a lawsuit for employment related disability discrimina-
tion, while a worker injured off the job could. The person in-
jured off the job enjoyed a full range of civil legal remedies
that the person injured on the job did not enjoy. Workers who
were disabled on the job, and then discriminated against,
were limited to workers' compensation penalties.
* Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. The
author would like to thank Richard Felton, Brad Seligman, Judith Fischer,
Craig Anthony Arnold and Judge Steve Siemers for their valuable contributions
to this article.
1. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 158 (Ct. App.
1996) (decided by the 2nd Appellate District, Division 6), review granted, No.
S057121 (Nov. 26, 1996) [hereinafter Dillon].
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The Dillon case not only reverses long standing prece-
dent that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for
workplace disability discrimination, it has also caused a split
in a California Court of Appeal district, District Two. This
split, and the underlying important public policy considera-
tions concerning the rights of the disabled, has invited Cali-
fornia Supreme Court review. The decision in Dillon is the
opposite of the District Two decision in Cammack v. GTE
Corp.2 Both cases address the same issue: Does a 1993
amendment to the state's Fair Employment and Housing Act 3
(hereinafter "FEHA") allow an injured worker to file suit in
state court for violation of the FEHA, for discrimination on
the basis of disability?
In Dillon, a secretary for the city suffered a knee injury
at work, and filed a workers' compensation claim.4 She was
off work for the knee surgery, but after her recovery, her doc-
tor released her to return to work.' However, when she re-
turned, her supervisor told her she had been terminated from
work.6 Dillon did inform the city she would still like to return
to work if certain accommodations for her disability could be
made, but was told the city would not re-hire her.7 She filed a
discrimination claim under the FEHA, and the Fair Employ-
ment Housing Commission (hereinafter "FEHC") authorized
her to bring a civil suit.
The city demurred to Dillon's complaint, arguing that
workers' compensation was Dillon's exclusive remedy.' The
Superior court overruled the demurrers to the causes of ac-
tion for discrimination and wrongful termination, and the
City filed a writ of mandate.9
The court expressly rejected the City's contention that
Dillon's sole remedy was under Labor Code § 132a of the
Workers' Compensation Act, holding it did not fall into the
2. 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d (Ct. App. 1996) (decided by the 2nd Appellate District,
Division 5), review granted, No. S056183 (Nov. 26, 1996). It is not certain
whether the Court will review both cases together, or one at a time.
3. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12993 (West Supp. 1996). This amendment became
effective January 1, 1994.








"so-called compensation bargain."10 The court stated that
prior cases11 holding an employee's claim of disability dis-
crimination, arising out of a work related injury, was pre-
empted by the workers' compensation law, were no longer ap-
plicable because of recent amendments to the state's Fair
Employment and Housing Act. 2
The FEHA declares it is the public policy of this state to
"protect individuals from discrimination in employment mat-
ters on the basis of physical handicap," among other things.'3
It is unlawful to terminate a person based on physical handi-
cap. 4 Cal. Gov't Code § 12993(a) provides that "nothing con-
tained in this part shall be deemed to repeal any provision of
the Civil Rights Law or of any other law of this state relating
to discrimination because of race, religious creed, color, na-
tional origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability,
medical condition, marital status, sex or age."'" In 1993, the
California Legislature amended § 12993 with the following
phrase: "unless those provisions provide less protection to
the enumerated classes of persons covered under this part." 6
Before this amendment, discrimination for workplace
disability was pre-empted by Labor Code § 132a,17 part of the
10. Dillon, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159.
11. The court specifically mentioned the cases of Langridge v. Oakland Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 34 (Ct. App. 1994); Angell v. Peterson Tractor
Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (Ct. App. 1994); and Usher v. American Airlines, Inc.,
25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1992).
12. Dillon, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160.
13. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12920 (West Supp. 1996).
14. See id. § 12940. Some exceptions do apply.
15. CAL. GoVT CODE § 12993(a) (West Supp. 1996).
16. Id. The provision became effective on January 1, 1994. See A.B. No.
2244, 1993-1994 Reg. Sess., 1993 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1977, § 15 (West).
17. Section 132a provides:
It is the declared policy of this state that there should not be discrimi-
nation against workers who are injured in the course and scope of their
employment. Any employer who discharges, or threatens to discharge,
or in any manner discriminates against any employee because he or
she has filed or made known his or her intention to file a claim for
compensation with his or her employer or an application for adjudica-
tion, or because the employee has received a rating, award, or settle-
ment, is guilty of a misdemeanor and the employee's compensation
shall be increased by one-half, but in no event more than ten thousand
dollars ($10,000), together with costs and expenses not in excess of two
hundred fifty dollars ($250). Any such employee shall also be entitled
to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits
caused by the acts of the employer.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1996).
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Workers' Compensation Act. As the remedies in § 132a are
fairly limited, and the remedies for civil damages under the
FEHA are far more extensive, the Dillon court applied this
amendment to such discrimination cases, and held "the plain
meaning of the statute" allows a worker to bypass the exclu-
sive remedy provisions of workers' compensation.18
In Dillon, one division of the Second District of the Court
of Appeal split with another division, which decided the same
issue a month earlier, but came to the opposite conclusion. In
Cammack v. GTE Corp.,9 the court held the amendment to
§ 12993 did not repeal the pre-emptive effect of Labor Code
§ 132a. There, an employee suffered a carpal tunnel injury
disability.2 ° He requested a "reasonable accommodation" at
work, but was terminated soon after his workers' compensa-
tion benefits expired. 21 The worker filed a lawsuit under the
FEHA, and defendants demurred to the suit.22 The demurrer
was sustained and the employee filed an appeal.23
The Cammack court stated the sole issue on appeal was
whether the plaintiffs FEHA discrimination claim based on
termination for a work-related injury was pre-empted by the
Workers' Compensation Act.24 This court ruled that it was,
for a number of reasons. 25 First, it believed the claim fell
within the "compensation bargain."26 Second, after reviewing
the legislative history of the Act, it ruled that the amendment
to § 12993 was intended to correct remedies in the housing
aspects of the law, not the employment area of the law.27
Third, it believed the Legislature did not intend to have the
amendment to § 12993 act as a repeal for Labor Code
§ 132a.28
This article will explore the conflicting reasoning behind
Dillon and Cammack, and the historic "compensation bar-
gain" to determine if the Dillon court was correct in finding
18. Dillon, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 160 (Ct. App. 1996).
19. 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996).
20. Id. at 840.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 841.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 842.
25. Cammack, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842.
26. Id. at 844. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing the "compensation
bargain").
27. Id. at 850-51.
28. Id. at 848.
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that discrimination based on disability is outside the workers'
compensation bargain.29 It will explain the separate policy
goals behind workers' compensation laws, and the civil rights
laws contained in the FEHA.3 ° It will also explore the cases
prior to Dillon and the conflict between the FEHA and the
Workers' Compensation Act.3 ' These are the tasks that lie
ahead for the California Supreme Court, which is faced with
the important policy consideration of treating all disabled
workers equally when discriminated against at work, regard-
less of where their injury or disability occurs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Historic "Compensation Bargain"
Many of the past decisions concerning whether disability
discrimination was pre-empted by Labor Code § 132a relied
on the often cited "compensation bargain."32 The compensa-
tion bargain involves the employer assuming liability for in-
dustrial personal injury or death without regard to fault, in
exchange for protection against civil liability.33 The idea is
that employees would be afforded swift and certain payment
of benefits to cure or relieve the effects of an industrial injury
without having to prove fault, but in exchange, give up the
wider range of damages potentially available in tort.34 The
Supreme Court has held that the compensation bargain must
stem from "a risk reasonably encompassed within the com-
pensation bargain."35
The basis of compensation and the exclusive remedy pro-
vision is that there must be an injury sustained "arising out
of and in the course of employment."36 Section 3601 specifi-
cally provides "the right to recover such compensation, pursu-
ant to the provisions of this division is, except as specifically
provided in this section, the exclusive remedy for injury or
death of an employee."37
29. Id. at 853.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part III.
32. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990).
33. Id. at 16.
34. Id.
35. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 729 P.2d 743, 747 (Cal. 1987).
36. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3600-01 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996.)
37. Id. § 3601 (emphasis added).
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The courts have spent enormous amounts of time over
the years determining what fits within the exclusive remedy
rule and compensation bargain. The courts recognize that it
should be limited to personal, physical or mental injury or
death as provided by the statute. There have been numerous
circumstances where the courts have decided that certain
claims or causes of action are outside the compensation bar-
gain, including the following: a claim for violations of the
FEHA based on gender discrimination,3" race discrimina-
tion,39 religious discrimination,4 ° where the employer or in-
sured stepped out of their proper roles and engaged in
fraud,4 1 where the employer engaged in tortious discharge in
contravention of public policy,42 where the employer conducts
a deceitful investigation of an employee,43 where an em-
ployee's termination violates the whistle blower statute,44
where an employer sexually harasses an employee and
causes emotional distress,45 and for civil suits for false im-
prisonment of an employee.46
Looking back at what the Legislature initially intended
by the historic tradeoff of rights in the "compensation bar-
gain," it is clear that only suits involving personal injuries
38. B & E Convalescent Ctr. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 9 Cal. Rptr.
2d 894, 896-98 (Ct. App. 1992).
39. Jones v. Los Angeles Comm. College Dist., 244 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Ct. App.
1988) (race discrimination).
40. Goldman v. Wilsey Foods, Inc., 265 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Ct. App. 1989).
41. Johns Mansfield Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 612 P.2d 948 (Cal.
1980) (finding that workers' compensation was not the exclusive remedy for in-
juries caused by an employer's failure to notify the employee of known health
risks).
42. Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992).
43. Maguilo v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (Ct. App. 1975) (finding
that the legislature did not intend to scope an objective of the exclusive remedy
provision to include intentional assault).
44. See Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990); CAL. GoV'T CODE
§ 19683 (West. 1995) (CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19683 is also referred to as the
"whistleblower protection law").
45. Meniga v. Raleys, Inc., 264 Cal. Rptr. 319 (Ct. App. 1989) (allowing
claims for employment discrimination, defamation, intentional infliction of
emotional distress and loss of consortium, and concluding that the FEHA pre-
vailed over workers' compensation because the statute and public policy were
over-riding).
46. Fermino v. FedCo, Inc., 872 P.2d 559 (Cal. 1994) (holding that a civil
suit for false imprisonment of an employee suspected of stealing the proceeds of
a retail sales is not barred because the tort of false imprisonment involves crim-
inal conduct and for that reason is outside the compensation bargain).
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arising out of negligence were originally contemplated.47
Workers' Compensation laws 48 came about at the turn of the
century because workers were often thwarted in their at-
tempts to sue for negligence. 49  Not only did the employee
have to establish the employer's negligence to recover for in-
dustrial accidents, but employers could bribe coroners and
police to rule the accident was the employee's fault.50 The
laws also allowed even the negligent employer to avoid liabil-
ity through the defenses of contributory negligence, assump-
tion of risk, or the fellow servant doctrine, the "three wicked
sisters of the common law."5'
Because of the difficulty for the employee to prove negli-
gence, and because the employer wanted to avoid large dam-
47. See Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure
of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 797 (1982).
48. See Federal Employer's Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (cur-
rently codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1972)).
49. Philip D. Oliver, Once is Enough: A Proposed Bar of the Injured Em-
ployee's Cause of Action Against a Third Party, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 117, 124
(1989). See also Thompson, Under What Circumstances a Servant Accepts the
Risk of His Employment, 31 AM. L. REV. 82 (1897), which contains this view of
the rights of injured workers:
I do not want my professional brethren to think for one moment that I
balance the life of a railway brakeman against the slight expense to a
railway company of blocking its frogs and switches. I should be sorry
to have them think that I ever was willing to balance the life of a rail-
way brakeman against the slight expense to a railway company of
building the upper works of its bridges sufficiently high for a brakeman
to stand upon the top of his car without coming in contact with them.
These are murder-machines; and the rule of judge-made law which
holds the servant at all times and under all circumstances, bound to
avoid them at his peril, is a draconic rule. It is destitute of any sem-
blance of justice or humanity. It is cruel and wicked. It illustrates the
subserviency of the American judiciary to the great corporations ...
[Ilt puts the wealthy capitalist, corporate or unincorporate, upon the
same equality in this respect, as that of the starving laborer, who must
carry his meager dinner pail to his employment, no matter how dan-
gerous it may be, in order to get a little food, clothing and shelter for
his suffering family .... Those who can reconcile their consciences to
the cold brutality of the general rule with reference to the servant ac-
cepting the risk, are at liberty to do so; I envy neither their heads nor
their hearts.
Id. at 85-86.
50. PHILIP S. FONER, THE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 22 (1964). See also Ellyn Moscowitz & Victor Van Bourg, Carve-outs
and the Privatization of Workers' Compensation in Collective Bargaining Agree-
ments, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 7 (1995).
51. Dean Prosser coined this phrase in describing the conundrum that
workers found themselves in at the turn of the century. W. PROSSER & P. KEE-
TON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 536 (5th ed. 1984).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
age awards if an employee was able to prove negligence, this
historic "trade-off' (the so-called "compensation bargain") was
conceived.5 2 The workers' compensation system was enacted
to be a "no-fault" system, whereby the employee would re-
ceive quick, easy access to medical care, paid for by the em-
ployer, and to compensate the employee's wage loss during
the period of disability.5 3 This system was in exchange for
the employer's right to remain free from civil liability for per-
sonal injury or death.5 4 Although employers initially con-
tested these laws as an unconstitutional violation of their due
process rights, by 1913, most states had viable workers' com-
pensation laws.5
Claims for employment discrimination can be based on
race or sex discrimination, intentional or negligent infliction
of emotional distress, or wrongful termination in violation of
public policy. None of these claims even existed at the time of
this historic bargain. Discrimination is not ever a tort; it is a
violation of civil rights.56 The "compensation bargain" could
not possibly have included a trade-off of civil rights because
the cause of action for civil rights did not yet exist at the time
workers' compensation legislation was enacted. Over the
years, the courts have expounded on what should be included
or excluded in this compensation bargain, often ignoring the
realities of the bargain's very roots. When determining what
falls within the compensation bargain, an accurate historical
perspective must be applied to avoid the evolution of a one
sided bargain. There needs to be some limit on the types of
claims courts include in this bargain. Otherwise, the bargain
will become no bargain at all.
What was initially intended? The first cases to address
the employers liability in tort for its employee's injuries date
52. See ARTHUR R. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.20,
at 25 (1989).
53. See WARREN HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION § 1.0112] (rev. 2d ed. 1995). See also Leslie H.
Kawaler, Note, Intentional Torts Under Workers' Compensation Statutes: A
Blessing or a Burden?, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 181, 183 (1983).
54. HANNA, supra note 53, at § 1.102[2].
55. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
56. See Sterling Transit Co. v FEPC, 175 Cal. Rptr. 548, 549 (Ct. App. 1981)
("Every person's civil right to obtain and hold employment without discrimina-




back to 1837. Two cases, Priestly v. Fowler, 7 an English
case, and Murray v. South Carolina,58 an American case, dis-
cussed the nature of the employment relationship and the
employer's liability for negligent harm to their employees.
These courts did not conclude that the employers owed a duty
of care to its employees. They were only the first to discuss
the idea. Yet after these cases, there were few other cases
discussing the employer's duty of care to its employees until
the 20th century.
To say that there was no law on the subject before these
epic cases were handed down would be an error. The ut-
ter dearth of cases upon the subject indicates, clearer than
any judicial opinion could proclaim, an ironclad rule of
breathtaking simplicity: no employee could ever recover
from any employer for any workplace accident - period. In
retrospect, the legal outcome could be delicately phrased
by saying that the employer owed no duty of care to the
employee, that the employee assumed the risks of all inju-
ries associated with his employment, or that the employer
was wholly immune, not unlike the sovereign himself,
from legal accountability. Such conclusions were not
stated, let alone justified. Silence said it all: an employee
should be grateful for the opportunity for gainful employ-
ment. That he should receive any special legal protection
on top of his good fortune was quite unthinkable. In a so-
ciety in which disease and injury were rampant, and life
itself fragile and short, the result should not come as too
much of a surprise. Why should the legal system inter-
vene on behalf of those fortunate enough to gain employ-
ment when there were countless others, far worse off, who
would gladly trade places with them? . . . No successful
action for an industrial accident had been brought prior to
these [Priestly or Murray] suits. Afterwards, nothing had
changed.59
In 1880, the first laws to address employer liability for
negligence were passed in England60 and became the model
57. 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Ex. 1837).
58. 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385 (1841).
59. Epstein, supra note 47, at 777-78. See also H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 17 (1954) (noting that employees rarely brought
suits against their employers for work related injuries in the nineteenth
century).
60. Employer's Liability, 1880, 43 & 44 Vict. ch. 42 (Eng.).
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for several jurisdictions in the United States1.6  The English
act shows that workers' compensation began as compensation
for negligence only. The law stated, in pertinent part:
1. Whereafter the commencement of this Act personal in-
jury is caused to a workman
(1) By reason of any defect in the condition of the
ways, works, machinery, or plant connected
with or used in the business of the employer; or
(2) By reason of the negligence of any person in the
service of the employer who has any superinten-
dence entrusted to him whilst in the exercise of
such superintendence; or
(3) By reason of negligence of any person in the ser-
vice of the employer to whose orders or direc-
tions the workman at the time of injury was
bound to conform, and did conform, where such
injury resulted from his having so conformed; or
(4) By reason of the act or omission of any person in
the service of the employer done or made in obe-
dience to the rules or bylaws of the employer, or
in obedience to particular instructions given by
any person delegated with the authority of the
employer in that behalf; or
(5) By reason of the negligence of any person in the
service of the employer who has the charge or
control of any signal, points, locomotive engine,
or train upon a railway,
the workman, or in case the injury results in death, the legal
personal representatives of the workman, and any persons en-
titled in case of death, shall have the same right of compensa-
tion and remedies against the employer as if the workman had
not been a workman of nor in the service of the employer, nor
engaged in his work.
2. A workman shall not be entitled under this Act to any
right of compensation or remedy against the employer in any
of the following cases; that is to say,
61. See, e.g., Federal Employers' Liability Act, ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908)(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1976)); Federal Employers' Liability
Act, ch. 3073, 34 Stat. 232 (1906) (declared unconstitutional); Act of March 6,
1907, ch. 97, 1907 Cal. Stat. 119 (current version at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2803,
2804 (West 1989)); Act of May 14, 1887, ch. 270, 1887 Mass. Acts 899 (current
version at MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 153 (West 1958)). The Employers' Liabil-
ity Cases No.1, 207 U.S. 463 (1908) (declared the first of federal statutes uncon-
stitutional); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1911) (upholding
the second of the federal statutes).
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(1) Under the sub-section one of section one, unless the
defect therein mentioned arose from, or had not been
discovered or remedied owing to the negligence of the
employer, or of some person in the service of the em-
ployer, and entrusted by him with the duty of seeing
that the ways, works, machinery, or plant were in
proper condition.
(2) Under sub-section four of section one, unless the in-
jury resulted from some impropriety or defect in the
rules, bylaws, or instructions therein mentioned; pro-
vided that where a rule or bylaw has been approved
or has been accepted as a proper rule or bylaw of one
of Her Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, or by
the Board of Trade or any other department of the
Government, under or by virtue of any Act of Parlia-
ment, it shall not be deemed for the purposes of this
Act to be an improper or defective rule or bylaw.
(3) In any case where the workman knew of the defect or
negligence which caused his injury, and failed within
a reasonable time to give, or cause to be given, infor-
mation thereof to the employer or some person supe-
rior to himself in the service of the employer, unless
he was aware that the employer or such superior al-
ready knew of the said defect or negligence.62
Thus, this first step towards workers' compensation was
clearly limited to physical injuries resulting from negligent
acts. This enactment was an extreme step from the concept
of no liability at all, imposing as it did a moral and legal obli-
gation to employees when the employer's negligence caused
the harm.
The next real step was taken in 1897, in England, with
the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897.63
This statute became the model for subsequent American
statutes.64
In the new law, negligence was removed as a condition of
liability. The replacement language used today, "personal in-
jury by accident arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment" was added.65 Although this first workers' compensa-
tion statute was limited to certain categories of employees,66
62. Employer's Liability, 1880, 43 & 44 Vict. ch. 42 (Eng.).
63. Workmen's Compensation, 1897, 60 & 61, Vict. ch. 37 (Eng.).
64. Epstein, supra note 47, at 797.
65. Id.
66. Railway, factory, mine, quarry or engineering work. Id.
1997] 597
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it began the establishment of the "no-fault" concept for per-
sonal injuries arising out of the employment relationship.
Under the new law, employer defenses were also elimi-
nated, to comport with the no-fault concept. The statute did
not disallow the common law of tort against the employer en-
tirely, rather it kept the right to sue for intentional torts by
the employer. v
The early language of workers' compensation acts form
the basis of the compensation bargain. The broad coverage of
the "new" workers' compensation laws at the turn of the cen-
tury eliminated the need to prove negligence on both sides, as
well as the defenses of assumption of risk or fellow servant
rule.68
This history shows that the fundamental basis for the
compensation bargain was in tort law only, specifically the
law of negligence. An employee was compensated for the
"wrong" of physical injury. Violations of civil rights in the
workplace were not contemplated. Employment discrimina-
tion, a civil rights issue,69 was not established as a viable
cause of action until 1964, with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act.70 The idea that there was a trade-off of civil
rights actions, along with tort actions, as remedies covered by
workers' compensation laws, is unsupported by any workers'
compensation statute or by any logical reading of legislative
history.
B. Labor Code §132a
The California courts have created an anomaly to the
detriment of disabled workers. They have agreed that race
discrimination, sex discrimination, and age discrimination
are not part of the compensation bargain, yet they treat disa-
bility discrimination differently. This anomaly is a result of a
provision in the Workers' Compensation Act, Labor Code
§ 132a, that prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability.71
Labor Code § 132a provides: "It is the declared policy of
this state that there should not be discrimination against
67. Id.
68. See supra text accompanying note 48.
69. See Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
70. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-h (1986).
71. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1996); see supra note 17.
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workers who are injured in the course and scope of their em-
ployment."72 California is one of twenty-seven jurisdictions
that provide a statutory remedy for retaliatory discharge
based on filing a workers' compensation claim.73 Section
132a was enacted originally to provide protection from retali-
ation for filing a workers' compensation claim or testifying in
a workers' compensation proceeding.74 It was never intended
to serve the same purpose as recent laws, such as the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act 75 (hereinafter "ADA") and FEHA,
76
which protect against disability discrimination in a variety of
ways. Most notably, it was never intended to compel an em-
ployer to accommodate a worker's disability in the workplace,
and no such language exists in § 132a.
Section 132a does penalize an employer who "discharges,
or threatens to discharge, or in any manner discriminates
against an employee because he or she has filed or made
known his or her intention to file a [workers' compensation]
claim."77 The penalty for such discrimination is to increase
the employee's compensation by one-half, but in no case by
more than $10,000.78 The employee can also be reinstated
and reimbursed for lost wages and work benefits caused by
the acts of the employer.79
These penalties do not come close to the "make whole"
remedies of the FEHA. Under the FEHA, an employee can
recover all civil damages arising from tort and contract, in-
cluding damages for pain and suffering, loss of consortium
and loss of earnings 0 and can also seek punitive damages.8 '
As stated by the court in Dillon, "[tihe FEHA provides reme-
dies to eliminate discriminatory practices and a civil action to
72. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1996).
73. Jean C. Love, Retaliatory Discharge for Filing a Workers' Compensation
Claim: The Development of a Modern Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 551, 554
(1986).
74. See 1972 Cal. Stat. 874.
75. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (Supp. IV 1992).
76. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12993 (West Supp. 1996).
77. CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a(1) (West Supp. 1996).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Dillon, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 156, 162 (Ct. App. 1996).
81. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12970(a)(3) (West Supp. 1996).
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make the victim whole. The purpose of the workers' compen-
sation law, on the other hand, is that of rehabilitation."82
Labor Code § 132a was interpreted more broadly to pro-
tect workers rights in Judson Steel. 8 There, an employee
who was out on disability for a work-related injury, was ter-
minated during a lay-off.8 4 The employer did not take into
account the employee's seniority status, as required by the
union contract.8 5 The Court found the employer was not com-
pelled by the Collective Bargaining Agreement to terminate
the employee's seniority rights, or his employment, and did so
in violation of § 132a.16
The Judson Steel Court stated that § 132a declares a
"broad general policy condemning discrimination against
workers who are injured in the course of their employ-
ment."8 7 The employer argued that 132a was enacted only to
protect an employee from retaliatory discharge for filing a
claim.8 8 However, the court stated the 1972 amendment to§ 132a added a broader policy statement to the statute:
"there should be no discrimination against workers who are
injured in the course and scope of their employment" to the
statute.8 9 The court explained that the Legislature intended
this amendment to change prior law which singled out cer-
tain discriminatory acts and to declare a more general policy
in favor of preventing all discrimination against injured
employees. 90
The court held "those situations in which an employee is
penalized solely because he was injured on the job or had to
lose time from work because of a work injury (rather than for
example, situations in which the employer reasonably be-
lieves that the employee's injury prevents him from being
able to do his job in an appropriate manner) are within the
scope of § 132a."91
82. Dillon, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162.
83. Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Rd., 586 P.2d
564 (Cal. 1978).
84. Id. at 566.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 569
87. Id. at 570.
88. Id. at 568.





At the time § 132a of the Labor Code was enacted in
1941,92 there were no specific laws protecting workers from
workplace disability discrimination. The California FEHA
was enacted in 1959, 93 but did not include disability discrimi-
nation in its protections until 1974. 9' The Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) was not enacted until 1990.9" These
laws are more specific in correcting discrimination in the
workplace, and deal with accommodations for workplace disa-
bility. Labor Code § 132a does not.
The ADA was passed to "provide clear, strong, consistent
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against in-
dividuals with disabilities."96 It allows a broad range of rem-
edies for physical and mental disability coverage. 97 Further-
more, since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,98 a
victim can request general and punitive damages in addition
to loss of earnings where an employer fails or refuses to make
a good faith effort at accommodation.9 9 The remedies pro-
vided in Labor Code § 132a do not even come close to provid-
ing the same remedies as the Civil Rights Act.
The language used in the ADA, as well as the FEHA,
makes clear that the protections in these statutes are civil
rights.10 0 It is a violation of one's civil rights to discriminate
on the basis of disability, just as it is on the basis of race,
gender, age or religion. Waivers of the right to sue over viola-
tions of those civil rights were not included in the "compensa-
tion bargain." It could not have been. The ADA and FEHA
did not even exist at the turn of the century when the historic
trade-off of rights occurred. Thus, the anomaly created by the
California courts is without foundation.
92. Act of Sept. 13, 1941 Cal. Stat. ch. 401, § 1.
93. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12993 (West Supp. 1996).
94. Id.
95. American with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (Supp. IV 1992)).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1995).
97. Id.
98. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (1996).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(3) (1995).
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1995) and CAL. GOVT CODE § 12920 (West Supp.
1996).
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C. Remedies under the FEHA and ADA
The ADA does not replace state laws regarding disability
discrimination. 10 1 It does, however, set a floor and not a ceil-
ing by disclaiming any "intent to invalidate or limit remedies,
rights and procedures of any ... law of any state ... that
provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individu-
als than are afforded by this Act."'0 2 Workers' compensation
exclusivity could not be used to pre-empt an ADA claim, be-
cause the ADA provides for greater remedies and protections.
Further, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Consti-
tution and 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) would mandate the primacy
of the ADA.10 3
Title I of the ADA specifically provides that the filing of a
workers' compensation claim does not prevent an injured
worker from filing a charge of discrimination under the
ADA. 0 4 "Exclusivity" clauses in states' workers' compensa-
tion laws barring all other civil remedies related to an injury
that has been compensated by a workers' compensation sys-
tem do not preclude qualified individuals with a disability
from filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (hereinafter "EEOC").10 5 The EEOC recognizes
that civil rights violations are not part of the compensation
bargain relating to tort law, with which the historic trade-off
was concerned.
Although California has banned disability discrimination
in the workplace since 1974,106 the Legislature strengthened
the FEHA in 1992 by ensuring that the state statute provides
as much protection as the ADA.'0 7 Not only did the Legisla-
ture add mental disability to statutory protection, 0 8 but it
101. See Wood v. County of Alameda, 875 F. Supp. 659 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b) (1995) (emphasis added).
103. See Langridge v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31, 38 (Ct.
App. 1994) (stating that "the Supremacy Clause precludes any state restriction
on remedies provided by the ADA.").
104. 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1995).
105. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH Dis-
ABILITIES ACT, at 11-11 (Jan. 1992). See also Ranko Shiraki Oliver, The Impact
of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 on Workers' Compensa-
tion Law, 16 U. ARK. L. REV. 327 (1994).
106. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (West Supp. 1996).
107. Id. § 12926(1), amended by 1992 Cal. Stat. 911, 912, 913.
108. See id. § 12926(1) (West 1992).
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also broadened the definitions of all disability to be consistent
with the ADA protections.' °9
The 1992 FEHA amendments were part of a broader
bill" which proclaimed the following:
It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this Act to
strengthen California laws in areas where it is weaker
than the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ... and
to retain California law in areas when it provides more
protection for individuals with disabilities than the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act."'
This language from the California Legislature makes it
clear that laws within the state concerning disability discrim-
ination should be brought up to the highest protections possi-
ble under the law: the law of either the ADA or FEHA.
1 2
The legislature stated no intent to provide this protection for
one class of disabled workers (those injured or disabled
outside of the workplace), while excluding the other class of
disabled workers (those disabled at work.) Surely the legisla-
ture did not intend for one class of disabled workers to have
far fewer remedies for discrimination than the other, or it
would have specifically stated so.
Indeed, less than one year after the effective dates of the
1992 amendments to the FEHA, the California Legislature
underscored its concern that the new laws be fully imple-
mented by specifically taking into account the claims of in-
jured workers. 1 3 The Legislature ordered the Division of
Workers' Compensation to publicize and inform injured work-
ers of their rights, not only under the workers' compensation
laws, but also under the ADA and FEHA. 1" 4 The Legislature
109. Relevant language appears in § 12926(1) provides:
Notwithstanding subdivisions (i) and (k), if the definition of disability
used in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990... would result in
broader protection of civil rights of individuals with a mental disability
or a physical disability . . . then that broader protection or coverage
shall be deemed incorporated by reference into, and shall prevail over
conflicting provisions of the definitions in subdivisions (i) and (k).
Id. § 12926(1) (West Supp. 1996).
110. A.B. No. 1077, 1991-1992 Reg. Sess., 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 913
(West).
111. 1992 Cal. Stat. 913 (emphasis added).
112. See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7285.1(a) (1995), which provides the
"strong public policy in favor of employing the handicapped, and the adoption of
a liberal construction rule to effectuate the statutory purpose."
113. See 1992 Cal. Stat. 913.
114. CAL. LAB. CODE § 139.6 (West 1987), amended by 1993 Cal. Stat. 121.
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thus acted to strengthen FEHA disability rights to bring
them into conformance with the ADA.
However, until Dillon, the Court of appeal decisions in
the 1990's have ignored this mandate, and focused instead on
the "compensation bargain" encompassed in the Workers'
Compensation Act.
D. Prior Cases Exempting Workplace Disability
Discrimination
The first case to hold specifically that workplace disabil-
ity discrimination was within the purview of Labor Code
§ 132a, and not the FEHA, was Pickrel v. General Telephone
Co.'1 5 There, an employee suffered a back sprain while mov-
ing a ladder at work.'16 The employee filed applications with
the Workers' Compensation Board, and recovered damages
for her injury, which was approved by a Workers' Compensa-
tion judge.1 7 Later, the employee filed a civil action against
the employer alleging termination because of the physical
handicap in violation of Government Code § 12940.118 The
physical handicap she complained of in the civil action was
the same back problem she suffered on the job.' 19 She also
alleged the employer would not make reasonable accommoda-
tions to allow her to work in any position. 20
The employee's complaint was dismissed after the Supe-
rior court ruled on the employer's demurrer.' 21 The case was
appealed to the Court of appeal. 122 The Court of appeal
stated that the California Constitution vested the legislature
with "plenary power to create a complete system of workers'
compensation and to enforce liability on the part of employers
for industrial injuries to their employees."1 23
The court declared that the statutory scheme of worker's
compensation was "exclusive of all other statutory and com-
mon law remedies, and substitutes a new system of rights
and obligations for the common law rules governing liability




119. Id. at 878-79.
120. Id. at 879.





of employers for injuries to their employees."124 However, the
court stated that the underlying philosophy of the exclusivity
provisions of the workers' compensation system remains that
an employer who has complied with the law by securing the
payment of benefits through insurance should be immune
from tort action brought by injured workers. 125 Relying on
the Supreme Court decision in Judson Steel, 126 the court held
that § 132a applied to all employer actions which in any man-
ner discriminate against an industrially injured employee.' 27
The court's reasoning in this initial case was flawed from
the beginning. First, the remedies provided for in § 132a of
the Labor Code do not provide "substantial justice" to the in-
jured worker, as called for in the Constitution, when com-
pared with the remedies of the Fair Employment and Hous-
ing Act. Second, the court ignored its own language which
recognized the purpose of the exclusivity rule as the employ-
ers ability to remain immune from "tort action" brought by
injured workers. Decisions applying to the Fair Employment
and Housing Act have consistently referred to the violations
therein as civil rights actions, not tort actions. 128 Therefore,
an FEHA claim should not be within the compensation bar-
gain because it is not a tort action.
However, since this 1988 decision, the Courts of Appeal
have continued to interpret the exclusive remedy provisions
of Labor Code § 132a to disfavor workers' claims by broaden-
ing one side of the compensation bargain. In Usher v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc.,129 the court took the "compensation bar-
gain" further, by concluding that the appellant's causes of
action for breach of contract and handicap discrimination
were subject to the exclusive remedy provisions of Labor Code
§ 132a.13 0
124. Id.
125. Id. at 880 (emphasis added).
126. Judson Steel Corp. v. Worker's Compensation Appeals Bd., 586 P.2d
564 (Cal. 1978).
127. Id. at 570.
128. Accord County of Alameda v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 200
Cal. Rptr. 381 (Ct. App. 1984) (race discrimination), Cook v. Lindsay Olive
Growers, 911 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1990) (religious discrimination), Raytheon Co.
v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ct. App. 1989) (hand-
icap discrimination), Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 267 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Ct. App. 1990) (gender discrimination).
129. 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 335 (Ct. App. 1993).
130. Id. at 336.
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There, an employee who was temporarily disabled as a
result of an industrial injury to her back and knee, lost her
job during the time she was out on disability. 13 1 The em-
ployer attempted to find another job for the employee, but
was unsuccessful. 132 The employee filed a petition pursuant
to Labor Code § 132a, requesting lost wages, reinstatement
and a penalty. 133 However, she also filed a complaint in Su-
perior court raising breach of contract and handicap discrimi-
nation claim.13 1
The Superior court in Usher granted the employer's mo-
tion, citing the Pickrel case.' 35 The case was appealed to, and
reviewed by, the First District Court of Appeal.'
36
Relying first on the Shoemaker case, the court discussed
that a termination from employment, involving work related
disability, is subject to the exclusive remedy provisions un-
less there is "an express or implied statutory exception where
the discharge results from risks reasonably deemed not to be
within the compensation bargain." 37 The court stated that
since the Shoemaker case rested on wrongful termination
under the "whistle-blower statute," ' 38 the whistle-blower law
was the more specific law.' 39 If a law is more general, such as
the Workers' Compensation Act, the court found that the
more specific law would apply.'
40
The court rejected the appellant's attempt to analogize
Shoemaker to the Usher case by arguing that the handicap
provisions of the FEHA and the "whistle-blower law" are the
more specific law, whereas § 132a of the Labor Code would be
the more general law. 14  The court stated that while the
FEHA was enacted to protect the right to "seek, obtain and
hold employment without discrimination" on specific
grounds, the statute expressly states it is not an exclusive
remedy and is not to be "deemed to repeal any other provi-




134. Id. at 337.
135. Usher, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339.
136. Id. at 336.
137. Id. at 338 (citing Shoemaker, 801 P.2d 1054 (Cal. 1990)).
138. CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 19683 (West 1995).





ing to discrimination."142 Of course, at the time this decision
was made, the amendment to § 12993(a) was not yet enacted,
and did not include the additional language "unless those
provisions provide less protection to the enumerated classes
of persons covered under this act.' 43
The court reasoned that the Legislature was presumably
aware of the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compen-
sation Act when it passed the FEHA, yet disclaimed any in-
tent to repeal this pre-existing exclusive remedy for a partic-
ular type of discrimination.14 4 Since the Usher decision in
1993, the Legislature was presumably still aware of the ex-
clusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act; an
awareness which surely also existed just one year later in
1994 when the Legislature amended § 12993(a). On the sur-
face, this amendment certainly seems to provide for the
greater remedy contained in the FEHA.
The Angell case 1 5 was decided soon after the new
amendment to the FEHA took effect, yet the court did not dis-
cuss the new law. The statutory amendment was never dis-
cussed in this decision. In Angell, an employer terminated an
employee who was receiving workers' compensation benefits
for work-related heart attacks.146 The employee sued the em-
ployer, alleging the employer discriminated against him
based on a physical handicap in violation of the FEHA.'
47
The court granted the employer's summary judgment motion,
finding that the employer's action was pre-empted by the ex-
clusive remedy provision. 48 The court of appeal affirmed.
49
The Angell case was even stronger than earlier court of
appeal decisions. It concluded that discrimination based on a
work-related physical handicap is a risk explicitly included by
the Legislature in the compensation bargain.' 50
The court stated that Labor Code § 132a, on its face, only
provides a remedy against employers who retaliate for work-
142. Id.
143. See supra note 12.
144. Usher, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338.
145. Angell v. Peterson Tractor, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541 (Ct. App. 1994).




150. Id. at 551 (relying on Labor Code § 132a).
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ers' use of the workers' compensation system. 151 However,
the court went on to apply the Judson Steel case, contending
that any discrimination against an employee based on a
work-related injury is covered by § 132a. 152 The court con-
tended that even if Angell was unlawfully terminated be-
cause of his work-related heart condition, the termination
was in violation of § 132a and the remedies of § 132a are the
only remedies available. 15 3 In citing to Pickrel,15 1 the court
stated that "intervening developments in the law concerning
workers' compensation exclusivity" made it necessary to con-
tinue the analysis. 155
The court continued its analysis by relying on the Shoe-
maker case. 156 In Shoemaker, the court held the following:
[D]isabling injuries, whether physical or mental, arising
from termination of employment are generally within the
coverage of workers' compensation and subject to the ex-
clusive remedy provisions, unless the discharge comes
within an expressed or implied statutory exception or the
discharge results from risks, reasonably deemed not to be
within the compensation bargain. 157
Before Shoemaker II, the courts had decided that viola-
tions of the FEHA based on age, gender, and race discrimina-
tion are not pre-empted by the workers' compensation
laws. 15 s The causes of action for age, gender and race dis-
crimination fall squarely within those categories of actions
which have been held to violate fundamental and substantial
public policies delineated in important state statutes and are
consequently outside the exclusive remedy provisions of
workers' compensation. 159 However, the Angell court re-
viewed the history of the compensation bargain, and held
that physical disability discrimination is within the
bargain. 60
151. Angell, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545.
152. Id. (relying on Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals




156. Id. at 546.
157. Angell, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546 (quoting Shoemaker v. Myers, 801 P.2d
1054 (Cal. 1990)).
158. See supra notes 24-32.
159. See Angell, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 551.
160. Id. at 548.
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The Angell court determined that the Legislature in-
tended the workers' compensation law to provide the exclu-
sive remedy for discriminatory termination based on a work-
related injury and did not intend to grant or allow additional
remedies.161
While the Pickrel court based its conclusion solely on the
fact that Labor Code § 132a specifically provides a remedy for
discrimination based on a work-related physical handicap,
the Angell court went further by stating that the provisions
are intended to effectuate and implement the fundamental
compensation bargain said to underlie the workers' compen-
sation scheme. 162 The Angell court relied on the language of
the FEHA and Government Code § 12993, but never the
§ 12993 amendment. It is apparent that when the Angell
court rendered its decision, it was not aware of the language
added to § 12993, providing for the stronger state remedy.
The amendment issue was finally addressed in Lan-
gridge v. Oakland Unified School District. 163 There, the court
specifically held that physical disability discrimination based
on a work-related injury was pre-empted by the exclusive
remedy provisions of the workers' compensation law.'16 The
plaintiff, a school district employee, wished to return to work
after a disability finding, asserting she was able to perform
the essential functions of her job with reasonable accommo-
dation. 165 She was not reinstated, and sued the School Dis-
trict under the FEHA claiming physical disability
discrimination. 166
The court first focused on what risks fall within the com-
pensation bargain and relied on the precedence of Pickrel,
Angell, and Usher.167 However, the court began its discus-
sion with the dissent in Angell.16 ' There, a dissenting justice
argued that the remedies provided by Labor Code § 132a do
not fit within the "metaphorical paradigm" of the workers'
compensation bargain because "under Labor Code § 132a, the
employee must still prove fault - it cannot be assumed that
161. Id. at 549-50.
162. Id. at 551.




167. Id. at 35-37.
168. Id. at 36.
1997] 609
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
every dismissed employee with a work-related physical hand-
icap was fired for that reason - and as a consequence payment
is neither swift nor certain."169 The Langridge court stated
there was some logic to this argument. 170 An employee
claiming discrimination must prove detrimental conduct by
the employer as a result of the industrial injury to obtain the
remedies provided by § 132a. 171 This requirement implies an
element of fault by the employer. Such a requirement is theo-
retically inconsistent with the workers' compensation bar-
gain, which has a "no fault" basis.172
However, the court ultimately rejected this argument
contending the element of fault in Labor Code § 132a does not
take work-related disability discrimination outside the scope
of the compensation bargain.1 73 The court relied on Labor
Code § 4553, which prescribes increased penalties for an em-
ployer's serious and willful misconduct in causing injury or
death to its employees.' 7 4 It believed the analogy of allowing
the penalty and proving fault for serious and willful miscon-
duct, would apply to § 132a as well.' 7 5 The court rejected
Langridge's argument that the application of § 132a makes
the amendment to the FEHA "totally idle."' 76 The court
stated the FEHA prescription still applies to all disability dis-
crimination that is not based on work-related injuries.177 It
rejected Langridge's argument that such a distinction vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause by treating persons with
work-related disabilities different from those with non-work-
related disabilities.17 8 It held that the workers' compensation
laws which create this different treatment of disabled work-
ers do not violate equal protection. 179
169. Angell v. Peterson Tractor, Inc., 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 541, 552 (Ct. App.
1994).
170. Landridge, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37.




175. Id. at 37.
176. Landridge, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37-38.





III. ANALYSIS OF THE 1994 FEHA AMENDMENT, AND THE
CAMMACK AND DILLoN CASES
In Cammack, "I the Court, of Appeal for the Second Dis-
trict looked at the plain language of the amended statute, and
concluded it could not follow it, because it would effectively
"repeal" § 132a.' s ' It not only ruled that the amendment to
the FEHA had no implied repeal of the pre-emptive effect of
§ 132a, but also concluded that § 132a requires employers to
accommodate persons disabled by work-related injuries. 2
No other court decisions have interpreted § 132a that
broadly.
In Cammack, an employee who suffered from bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome became disabled.' 8 3 Later he at-
tempted to return to work before his benefits had expired,
and he requested a "reasonable accommodation" at his place
of work.1'8 The employer refused and the employee was ter-
minated.'" 5 The Federal EEOC issued a right to sue letter,
although the plaintiff eventually decided to file his discrimi-
nation case under the state Fair Employment and Housing
Act.186
The trial court sustained the employer's demurrer, con-
tending that the Workers' Compensation Act was the em-
ployee's exclusive remedy."' In affirming, the Court of ap-
peal held that a plaintiffs FEHA discrimination claim based
on a work-related injury is pre-empted by the Workers' Com-
pensation Act.' 88
The Cammack court set out the relevant authority, yet
then proceeded to ignore that authority. In construing the
workers' compensation statutes, the court cited the California
Supreme Court's guidelines for statutory interpretation.
The rules governing statutory construction are well set-
tled. We begin with the fundamental premise that the ob-
jective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effec-
tuate legislative intent. In determining intent, we look
180. Cammack v. GTE Corp., 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 837 (Ct. App. 1996).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 850.
183. Id. at 840.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Cammack, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 842.
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first to the language of the statute, giving effect to its
plain meaning. Although we may properly rely on extrin-
sic aids, we should first turn to the words of the statute to
determine the intent of the legislature. Where the words
of the statute are clear, we may not add or alter them to
accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of
the statute or from its legislative history.1 89
Although the court stated its duty was to look at the
"plain meaning" of the statute and give the statute its effect
unless the words were unclear, it flatly ignored that duty.
The words of § 12993 could not be any clearer. The laws of
the Fair Employment and Housing Act must be followed, if
they provide a stronger remedy than other state laws for the
same type of discrimination. There is no dispute that the
FEHA provides a stronger remedy than § 132a of the Work-
ers' Compensation Act.
The Court in Cammack chose to look at this issue as one
of "implied repeal." 9 ' The court stated that § 12993 (a) did
not impliedly act to repeal Labor Code § 132a or §§ 3600,
3602.'9' They discussed the Supreme Court's decision that
implied repeals of well established rules of law are disfa-
vored. 192 The court stated it would not presume the existence
of such an intent in the absence of an express declaration. 193
The court explained that repeals by implication are not fa-
vored and are recognized only when there is no rational basis
for harmonizing two potentially conflicting laws. 194 Further,
it stated they must assume that when passing a statute, the
legislature is aware of existing related laws and that they in-
tend to maintain a consistent body of rules.195
Clearly though, the Legislature could rationalize a basis
for having conflicting laws here. It probably was aware that
§ 132a of the Labor Code existed to protect employees from
being discriminated against for filing workers' compensation
claims, yet it still indicated its desire to have the strongest
protections possible for disability discrimination, when enact-
189. Id. (relying on Burden v. Snowden, 828 P.2d 672 (Cal. 1992)).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 222.
192. Cammack, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848 (citing Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v






ing the amendments to the FEHA. Furthermore, they may
have recognized there was no duty to accommodate a disabil-
ity in § 132a, though such a remedy exists under the
FEHA.196 Finally, the Legislature was no doubt aware that
"disability" is defined differently under workers' compensa-
tion laws and the FEHA. 197 Given the different definitions, a
disabled worker possibly could have a claim under § 132a,
but not qualify under the FEHA. For example, a laborer
hurts his back at work, but the back injury will heal fully in a
few months. If in the meantime he is discriminated against
for that disability, he could take action under Labor Code
§ 132a, but not under the ADA or FEHA, because he does not
have a substantial limitation on a major life activity. If the
injury will fully heal, he will not remain a "qualified individ-
ual with a disability." Thus, it is possible for both remedies to
remain open (under both § 132a and the FEHA), depending
on the extent and nature of the disability.
The Cammack court stated it reviewed the substantial
legislative committee reports prepared in connection with the
adoption of the amendment to § 12993, and that there was no
reference made to the Workers' Compensation Act in general
or Labor Code § 132a specifically. 198 Thus it concluded the
amendment could not "repeal" § 132a.'9 9 The Cammack
court did not understand that § 132a could remain valid,
along with the FEHA protections, as alternative remedies.
Besides focusing on the repeal of the pre-emptive provi-
sions of the Workers' Compensation Act, the court also stated
that disability discrimination is included in the "compensa-
tion bargain."200 While reviewing the long line of cases where
the courts found that certain actions were outside the com-
pensation bargain, the court stated they had no doubt the leg-
196. CAL. GOVT CODE § 12926(k) (West Supp. 1996).
197. Under the ADA, which is followed by the FEHA, CAL. GOVT CODE
§ 12926(k) (West Supp. 1996), a "qualified individual with a disability" is a per-
son who has an impairment that "substantially limits a major life activity." 42
U.S.C. § 12102(s)(A) (1995). The person must be able to perform the essential
functions of a job currently held or desired, with or without accommodation. Id.
On the other hand, under Workers' Compensation, work related injuries do not
always cause physical or mental impairments severe enough to alter a "major
life activity." Many on the job injuries can cause non-chronic impairments
which may heal in a certain period of time.
198. Cammack, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 853.
1997] 613
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
islature intended the pre-emptive effect of the Worker's Com-
pensation Act to apply to intentional discrimination directed
at an employee who seeks the benefits of the workers' com-
pensation system.2° '
Unlike religious, sexual, or other forms of discrimination,
the legislature enacted Labor Code section 132a, which
applies specifically to bias directed at the disabled arising
out of a workers' compensation claim. This is solely an
issue of legislative intent. There can be no doubt that La-
bor Code section 132a was intended to apply to the dis-
crimination directed at the disabled. 20 2
However, the court offered no support for such an asser-
tion. It failed to distinguish the goals of Labor Code § 132a
(to protect employees from retaliation or discrimination for
disabilities connected with their workers' compensation
claim) and the duties to accommodate the disabled under the
Fair Employment and Housing Act or the Americans with
Disabilities Act. It also failed to note the differences in the
definition of disability within the Workers' Compensation Act
versus the FEHA. The fatal flaw in the court's reasoning is
grounded in its failure to distinguish between disabilities for
purposes of workers' compensation (a no-fault system) and
disabilities under the civil rights laws. For these reasons, the
Court of Appeal for the Second District split in its decision of
this very important issue.
Less than six months later, Division 5 of the Court of Ap-
peal for the Second District took a directly opposite position.
The Dillon court began its discussion by rejecting the notion
that disability discrimination is part of the "so-called compen-
sation bargain" of workers' compensation.20 3 It recognizedthat disability discrimination was not within the original
204 Ti or
compensation bargain. This court expressly rejected the
line of reasoning of Langridge by pointing out that the court
had ignored the important amendment to Government Code
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The City of Moorpark argued that the plain meaning of
the amended statute should be ignored, and that the legisla-
tive history behind the amendment should be examined.20 7
However, the court said that this argument ignored the
"hoary maxim that the plain language of the statute
prescribes its interpretation by the courts. When statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for con-
struction and the court should not indulge in it."20 The court
went on to explain:
[Flor a refreshing change, [here] is a statute that is clear
and intelligible. Its words do not beg to be understood nor
do they defy comprehension. The plain meaning of Gov-
ernment Code section 12993 is simply this: should any
provision of state law offer less protection than does the
FEHA, then such provision is inoperable and effectively
pre-empted by the FEHA.2 °9
The court, rejecting the logic of the Cammack court, stated
that if this was not what the Legislature intended to say,
then it was for the Legislature to change the statute, not the
court. 210 The Dillon court affirmed that courts are confined
by the nature and scope of the judicial function and its partic-
ular exercise in the field of interpretation. 211  They stated
that the court cannot rewrite a statute, "neither to enlarge it
nor contract it."
2 12
The Dillon court specifically disagreed with the recent
decision of the same district in the Cammack case. 21 3 It
stated that although that court arrived at its conclusions
through a "painstaking review of the legislative committee
reports prepared for the adoption of the amendment to
§ 12993," that review was unnecessary because § 12993(a) is
clear on its face.2 14 The statute expressly repeals those provi-
sions of law that offer less protection.21 5
In Dillon, the City argued, as an alternative, that the
FEHA provides less protections than the Workers' Compen-
207. Id.
208. Id.
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sation Act.216 The court refuted this absurdity and concluded
that the FEHA laws offer more protection than the Workers'
Compensation Act.217 The Dillon court acknowledged that
the purpose of the FEHA is to "provide effective remedies
which will eliminate discriminatory practices."218 A party
seeking a claim of discrimination under the FEHA has many
remedies, including a cease and desist order, actual damages
(including back pay and emotional distress), punitive dam-
ages, an order for reasonable accommodations, and attorney's
fees. 219 They reiterated that civil damages are intended to
make whole those persons who have suffered detriment from
the unlawful act or omission of another.220 The civil damages
may also include amounts for pain and suffering, loss of con-
sortium, and lost earnings.22'
The court further explained that workers' compensation
benefits provide significantly smaller monetary awards than
civil suits. 222 Under Workers' Compensation, injured em-
ployees are provided with the following benefits: medical
treatment, temporary disability, permanent disability, and
death benefits.223 The court explained that the amount of
workers' compensation benefits, other than medical expenses,
is determined as a percentage of the worker's earnings. 24 As
a result, an injured worker receives less than the total of ac-
tual lost wages. 225 Furthermore, nothing is paid to compen-
sate the worker for pain and suffering, nor does the scheme of
compensation permit a worker to obtain punitive damages.226
Under the provisions of Labor Code § 132a, the Workers'
Compensation Act does allow a penalty for disability discrim-
ination. 227 The employee will be assessed with a 50% in-
crease in the amount of award of compensation up to the
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and expenses of up to $250.228 However, the court explained
that this penalty is clearly not as significant as the remedies
under the FEHA.229
Most importantly, the Dillon court recognized that the
FEHA specifically allows for remedies to eliminate discrimi-
natory practices.230 For example, the court may order injunc-
tive relief to effect physical changes in the workplace to ac-
commodate a person with a disability.
The Dillon court also rejected the Cammack court's belief
that by following the amendment to the FEHA, the courts
would be effectively repealing the effects of § 132a.231 In Dil-
lon, the city argued that if the FEHA offers more protection,
then Labor Code § 132a is "superfluous."232 However, the
Dillon court explained that § 12993 repeals only the exclusiv-
ity provision of workers' compensation law as it applies to
workers such as Dillon, who claimed discrimination because
of disability.233 It does not prevent an employee who so
chooses from pursuing a claim of discrimination before the
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. 234 There is nothing
unusual about the availability of alternative remedies for
resolving civil disputes.235
The Dillon court then reviewed the extensive history of
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the state disability
laws. 236 The Dillon court reiterated that the FEHA unques-
tionably embodies the fundamental public policy in Califor-
nia, and that the rights of the disabled must be protected at
all costs. 237 Permitting an employer to freely discriminate
against the disabled, by not allowing for the fullest remedies
possible on behalf of the victims, would be "highly offensive to
those essential policies that are expressed in the above-men-
tioned legislation. In light of those policies, the public inter-
est is well served by allowing Dillon, under the facts alleged
in her complaint, to proceed with her cause of action."238
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Dillon, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162.
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The Supreme Court should adopt the explicit and im-
plicit rationale of the Dillon case, which are as follows: 1)
section 132a and the FEHA establish distinct legal remedies
based on scope, purpose and remedies;
2) the contrary interpretation of § 132a would undermine the
public policies behind the FEHA and the ADA, which is to
protect the civil rights of all disabled workers to the fullest
extent possible, and
3) the so-called "compensation bargain" should not overreach
its original goals by denying disabled workers full and com-
plete remedies.
Justice Antonin Scalia has stated in his recent book, A
Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, "[it is
the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver."239 And
it is not the job of the courts to divine legislative intent, but to
give effect to statutory text, construed neither strictly nor le-
niently, but "reasonably, to contain all that it fairly
means."240 The Dillon court was correct in holding that Gov-
ernment Code § 12993 should apply the plain meaning of the
text, and all it fairly means, to protect disabled workers to the
fullest extent possible.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Dillon court is the first court to fairly consider the
parameters of the workers' compensation laws, what it was
intended to protect and cover, and the rights of the disabled.
The Dillon court was indeed courageous. It was not blinded
by the language of the "historic compensation bargain" and it
looked further at the public policies on which the legislature
grounded the Fair Employment and Housing Act and its sub-
sequent amendments. The California Supreme Court is now
faced with resolving this conflict among the California Courts
of Appeal. Hopefully, it will see fit to put some parameters on
the so-called "compensation bargain," and avoid the contin-
ued inclusion of conditions that were not originally contained
in the bargain. The Supreme Court should effectuate the na-
tional policy embodied in the Americans with Disabilities Act
and the public policy of the State of California, under the Fair
Employment and Housing Act, by ensuring the strongest
239. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAw 29 (1996).
240. Id. at 23.
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remedies possible for victims of disability discrimination,
whether disabled on or off the job. California courts should
not use the Workers' Compensation Act to shield employers
from liability for discriminatory acts taken against disabled
employees.

